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Karpinos et al.: Comments

COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUITABLE POWER OF FEDERAL
COURTS: METROPOLITAN RELIEF MAY BE A PROPER REMEDY FOR
INTRA-GOVERNMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS. Hills v.

Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
In Hills v. Gautreaux' the United States Supreme Court
faced the question of whether a federal trial court may order
remedial action outside the city limits of Chicago for constitutional violations by the Chicago Housing Authority (hereinafter
referred to as CHA) and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter referred to as HUD)
within the city of Chicago. HUD and CHA had both been found
guilty of statutory and constitutional violations in their selections
of public housing sites.2 By ruling that a federal trial court may
order a plan encompassing metropolitan relief,3 the Supreme
Court meticulously distinguished Milliken v. Bradley.4 As a result, the Court in Gautreaux more clearly identified and explained the circumstances sufficient to justify a court's consideration of an interdistrict remedy for violations occuring within a
particular local governmental unit.
The Supreme Court resolved Gautreauxmore than a decade
after suits were initiated against CHA and HUD.' The most recent action, prior to acceptance on certiorari by the Supreme
Court, was by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in

Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority.I In an opinion written
by retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Tom Clark,
1. 425 U.S. 284 (1976), aff'g Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th
Cir. 1974).
2. The district court, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), found CHA had deliberately
selected family public housing sites to avoid placing black families in white neighborhoods. The court of appeals, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971), found HUD to have committed
violations by sanctioning and aiding CHA's discriminatory program. Id. at 739-40. The
Supreme Court dealt only with the appropriate scope of the remedy.
3. Metropolitan relief refers to a federal court's ordering an agency with authority
solely or primarily within a municipality to take remedial action beyond the legal boundaries of that municipality.
4. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
5. For a summary of the lengthy history of the Gautreaux cases, see Kishner and
Werner, MetropolitanDesegregation After Milliken v. Bradley: The Case for Land Use
LitigationStrategies, 24 CATH. U. AM. L. REv. 187, 197-200 (1975).
6. 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
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sitting by designation, the court of appeals reversed the district
court's decision denying relief beyond the city limits of Chicago.'
The court of appeals remanded the case for consideration of a
"comprehensive metropolitan area plan that will not only disestablish the segregated public housing system in the city of Chicago. . but will increase the supply of dwelling units as rapidly
as possible."' One month prior to the Seventh Circuit's opinion,
the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Milliken
v. Bradley' reversing the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
and holding that the multidistrict area-wide remedy to a single
district segregation violation was an inappropriate exercise of the
equitable authority of the federal courts."0 In order for an interdistrict remedy to be appropriate, the Milliken Court said "it must
be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local
school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.""
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the equitable factors
preventing metropolitan relief in Milliken were "simply not present" in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority. Unlike the
situation in Milliken, Justice Clark noted that public housing did
not have a tradition of local control. Administrative problems
involved in construction of public housing in the suburbs "are not
remotely comparable to the problems of daily bussing thousands
..."3 Further, unlike
of children to schools in other districts .
the Milliken case, metropolitan relief had been under consideration for a long time in Gautreauxv. Chicago HousingAuthority.'4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hills v. Gautreaux
in May, 1975."1 The case was argued January 20, 1976, and a
7. Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. fll. 1971). The district court had
found metropolitan relief unwarranted because the wrongs were committed within the
limits of Chicago and solely against residents of the city. There was no allegation that
HUD and CHA discriminated or fostered racial discrimination in the suburbs.
8. 503 F.2d at 939. "Given the eight year tortuous course of these cases, together with
the finding and judgment orders of the District Court and the opinions of this court (now
numbering five)," Clark said, "we believe the relief granted is not only much too little
but also much too late in the proceedings." Id. at 932.
9. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
10. Id. The court of appeals had approved a plan requiring consolidation of 54 school
districts in the Detroit metropolitan area to remedy racial discrimination in the operation
of the Detroit public schools. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973).
11. 418 U.S. at 745.
12. 503 F.2d at 936.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 937.
15, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
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decision was announced April 20, 1976. The Court upheld the
Seventh Circuit's decision but disagreed with its interpretation of
Milliken. Justice Stewart, who delivered the opinion, determined
that Milliken "was based on basic limitations on the exercise of
the equity power of the federal courts and not on a balancing of
particular considerations presented by school desegregation
cases ....

The Seventh Circuit's distinguishing of Miliken
,,,e

on the basis of differences between administering public schools
and public housing was incorrect, the Supreme Court said." Instead, the Court distinguished the two cases after considering the
equitable powers of the federal courts in light of the particular
facts in the Chicago housing situation.
In reversing the Sixth Circuit's approval of a district court
order calling for metropolitan relief, the Milliken Court did not
rule out the possibility that interdistrict remedies might be appropriate in some school discrimination cases. Such relief might
be suitable, the Milliken Court said, "where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district or where district lines have been
deliberately drawn on the basis of race.

18

The Gautreaux Court

further recognized that the Milliken decision did not deny the
federal courts' authority to order metropolitan remedies for constitutional violations within the boundaries of a municipality. 9
Applying this basic proposition, the Court discussed several factors that made metropolitan relief appropriate in Gautreaux
whereas it was not proper in Milliken.
The Court found a significant difference between the Detroit
school situation and the Chicago public housing program as to the
role of local governmental officials and the significance of local
district lines. While the Milliken Court noted that school districts
in Michigan are instrumentalities of the state,"0 it also recognized
a tradition of "local control over the operation of schools; local
autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and
to the quality of the educational process."'" Thus, while the Court
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

425 U.S. at 294.
Id. at 294-95 & n.11.
418 U.S. at 745.
425 U.S. at 297-98.
418 U.S. at 726 n.5.
Id. at 741-42.
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said local control was "not sacrosanct""2 neither were district
lines a "mere administrative convenience' ' 23 which could be casually ignored. In contrast, the Gautreaux Court stated that a
metropolitan remedy "need not displace the rights and powers
accorded suburban government entities under federal or state
law." 4
The GautreauxCourt did more than submit that a metropolitan remedy would cause no undeserved disruption. In contrast
to the traditional local school autonomy in Michigan, the
Gautreaux Court pointed out that Illinois statutes permit a city
housing authority to exercise its power in the unincorporated area
within three miles of the city's boundary. 2 Thus, the Court
seemed to recognize that in the Gautreaux case the city limits of
Chicago, unlike the traditional school district lines in Milliken,
are not significant in the task of finding an appropriate remedy
for the segregative housing violations.
A major reason that the Chicago city limits were not relevant
to the GautreauxCourt's consideration of a metropolitan remedy
is that nonlocal officials have a greater role in administering the
programs found responsible for the constitutional violations.
While the Michigan laws may have delegated final authority to
the state, substantial independent control over schools remained
with local officials. Therefore, a consolidation order directed at
the state would by necessity abrogate the rights and powers of the
suburban school districts. The Gautreaux Court recognized that
state educational administrators simply do not control local
school affairs in Michigan 6 and, thus, are not responsible for local
violations under the Milliken requirements.Y Even if the state
were responsible for segregation within Detroit, the Milliken
22. Id. at 744.
23. Id. at 741. In dissent, Justice Marshall contended that "[s]chool districts are not

separate and distinct sovereign entities under Michigan law, but rather are 'auxiliaries of
the State,' subject to its 'absolute power.'" Id. at 794 (citations omitted). Marshall concurred in Gautreaux and agreed with the Court's decision except insofar as it reaffirmed
Milliken.
24. 425 U.S. 298 n.13. A consolidation order in Milliken, the Gautreaux Court said,
would of necessity have abrogated the rights and powers of suburban school districts under
Michigan law.
25. Id. at 298-99 n.14. Further, the Gautreaux Court said, a city housing authority
may act outside its area of operation by contract with another housing authority or with
a state public body not within the area of operation of another housing authority. Id.
26. Id. at 298 n.13.
27. 418 U.S. at 756 (Stewart, J., concurring). The dissenters in Milliken, in contrast,
would have held the state responsible for violations by local officials and ordered a metropolitan remedy. Id. at 757.
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Court said, it does not follow that an interdistrict remedy is conor required without evidence of an interdisstitutionally justified
2

trict violation.

1

While state authorities were found to be only minimally involved in Milliken, the Gautreaux Court found that the involvement of nonlocal officials was much more substantial which was
further support for a decision necessitating metropolitan relief.
The Court pointed out that both HUD and CHA have authority
to operate outside the Chicago city limits." HUD has tradition-

ally operated on the basis of housing market areas which usually
extend beyond the city limits and might include parts of several
adjoining counties 0 Since HUD had previously determined the
appropriate housing market, a remedy in that area against HUD
would be commensurate with the nature and extent of the constitutional violation, regardless of whether the violation occurred
within the city limits of Chicago. 31 "The critical distinction between HUD and the suburban school districts in Milliken," the
Gautreaux Court declared, '32"is that HUD has been found to have
violated the Constitution.

Gautreaux Court considered the social and political
costs and benefits of requiring public housing to be placed in
Chicago's suburbs, as opposed to requiring consolidation of fiftyfour independent school districts as a basis for distinguishing the
two cases. Despite strong dissent,3 3 the Milliken Court stated that
a metropolitan desegregation plan with its ensuing problems of
financing, operations and transportation was not justified as a
response to a constitutional violation found to have occurred
within a single school district.34 The Gautreaux Court, however,
-The

concluded that the " 'practicalities of the situation' "3 in the Chi-

cago metropolitan area did not justify an absolute denial of possi28. Id. at 748.
29. 425 U.S. at 298. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
30. 425 U.S. at 299. HUD's responsibilities under federal regulations are in part to
select sites for public housing to "promote greater choice. . . and avoid undue concentration of assisted persons in areas containing a high proportion of low-income people." Id.
at 301-02.
31. Id. at 299-300.
32. Id. at 297.
33. For example, Justice White said the majority's remedy "is essentially arbitrary
and will leave serious violations of the Constitution substantially unremedied." 418 U.S.
at 780.
34. Id. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
35. 425 U.S. at 297 (quoting Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37
(1971)).
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bilities for a suburban remedy. The Court recognized that, similar to the suburban school districts in Milliken, the suburban
governments and suburban housing authorities in Chicago had
not been implicated in any unconstitutional conduct." However,
in Gautreaux the remedy was directed against HUD, which had
authority beyond the Chicago city limits, rather than against any
local governmental agency. Further, the Gautreaux Court said an
order directed at HUD would not force local governments to act
nor would it deny them their proper role in regulating development through zoning and other land use restrictions." The
Gautreaux Court had indicated that the question, whether an
order against HUD affecting its conduct beyond Chicago's boundary would impermissibly interfere with local governments, was a
more substantial issue than whether a federal court had the authority to make such an order.3 Based on its evaluation of the
structure of local governments and HUD in the Chicago area, the
Court correctly recognized that such an order would cause no
significant interference with local governmental entities. 9
Other factors which distinguish Gautreaux and Milliken include the timing of the metropolitan remedy as well as the initiation of action against the affected governmental agencies. In the
Detroit case, suburban school officials did not become involved
until they were joined as necessary parties for relief by the Sixth
Circuit."0 In direct contrast, the Chicago suits were originally
brought against HUD and CHA. The possibility of remedial action not confined to the city limits of Chicago was first raised at
the district court level and was under consideration for years prior
to its being ordered by the Seventh Circuit." The Seventh Circuit
stressed that this measure of relief had "been under consideration
for a long time" to distinguish the recent decision in Milliken.42
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

425 U.S. at 297.
Id. at 301 & 306.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 305-06.
418 U.S. at 754 (Stewart, J., concurring). For two views on whether the Milliken

outcome would have been different if the case were originally considered as one involving
a metropolitan violation, see Beer, The Nature of the Violation and the Scope of the
Remedy: An Analysis of Milliken v. Bradley in Terms of the Evolution of the Theory
of the Violation, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 903 (1975) and West, Another View of the Bradley
Violation: Would a Different Evolution Have Changed the Outcome?, 21 WAYNE L. Rv.
917 (1975). These articles are part of a symposium devoted to Milliken v. Bradley and the
future of urban school desegregation.
41. 425 U.S. at 289-91.
42. 503 F.2d at 937.
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In upholding the Seventh Circuit's decision, however, the Supreme Court did not discuss the fact that a metropolitan remedy
had been under consideration since the early stages of the litigation.4"
The controlling principle in the exercise of the remedial
power of the federal courts in cases involving constitutional violations, as articulated in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard
of Education," is that the "nature of the violation determines the
scope of the remedy." 45 The Milliken Court recognized this
principle by holding that violations occuring only within the Detroit school system required that the remedy must also be limited
to the Detroit system. In applying the Swann standard to racial
discrimination by HUD and CHA in Chicago public housing site
selection, the Gautreaux Court pointed out that the authority of
these two agencies to operate beyond the Chicago city limits was
one of the circumstances which made a metropolitan remedial
46
order reasonable.
The major significance of the Gautreaux case is that by permitting a district court to order HUD to engage in metropolitan
area-wide remedial efforts, the Court was able to distinguish the
Milliken case and make clearer when cross-district relief would
be appropriate. Rather than just attempting to apply the standards which were articulated in Milliken particularly for school
desegregation cases, and which might not have led to metropolitan relief in Gautreaux,the GautreauxCourt found metropolitan
relief would be appropriate because of the presence of a number
of factors. First, the local governmental lines in Gautreaux, unlike the school district lines in Detroit, were not relevant to the
remedy because officials of those local governments themselves
were not responsible for the violations. Second, in Gautreaux
there was no stong tradition of local district control of public
housing; rather, the federal government had long been influential
in administering the public housing program. Further, the viola43. One year earlier, in Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 963 (1975), the United States
Supreme Court had affirmed without a full opinion a three-judge panel's order calling for
consideration of interdistrict school desegregation remedies. The district court in that
case, Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del. 1975) distinguished Milliken in part
by pointing out that in the Delaware case the suburban districts were offered and took
advantage of an opportunity to present their evidence prior to the remedies stage. 393 F.
Supp. at 430.
44. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
45. Id. at 16.
46. 425 U.S. at 297-300.
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tions in Gautreaux were committed by officials whose authority
extended beyond the limits of the local governmental unit. Finally, unlike Milliken, the governmental bodies from whom relief
was sought were original parties in the suit and were not joined
solely at the remedial stage of the hearing. While the Supreme
Court itself did not place great weight upon this last distinction,
it was discussed by the Seventh Circuit." Weighing the impact
of a metropolitan area remedy and the equitable standards expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Swann, the Court
properly found that an interdistrict remedy was not inappropriate
in Hills v. Gautreaux.
Ralph D. Karpinos
47. This case also raises questions concerning the relationship between location of
public housing and school desegregation which are beyond the scope of this comment. For
a discussion of these questions, see Note, InterdistrictDesegregation: The Remaining
Options, 28 STAN. L. REv. 521 (1976). See also, Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. at 435,
where the court considered the practices of the Wilmington Housing Authority in putting
public housing units primarily in the inner city as part of the justification for ordering
consideration of a metropolitan school desegregation plan.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss5/6

8

Karpinos et al.: Comments

CONSUMER PROTECTION-STANDING-CONSUMERS

CAN

BRING A PRIVATE ACTION UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE

COMMISSION

ACT

IF HARMED BY PERSISTENT SALES PRACTICES THAT

WERE PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 5(A)(1) BY
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IN A CONSENT ORDER DIRECTED

AGAINST DEFENDANT'S FRANCHISOR.

Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the

Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC
Act)' declares unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce."' Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest3
marks the first successful attempt to imply a private remedy
under the FTC Act. Hitherto, section 5's broad dictates have been
held to be within the exclusive enforcement province of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).'
Guernsey holds that where a plaintiff alleges to have suffered
from persistent conduct by a defendant, already the subject of a
consent order issued by the FTC for the same violations, the

plaintiff has stated a claim under the Act. As a result, relief may
be merited, although nowhere in the Act are private parties expressly empowered to bring an action to enforce Commission consent orders.' In October of 1963 the FTC notified Rich Plan Cor1. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-77 (West Supp. 1976).
2. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (West Supp. 1976). Some states, including South Carolina,
have consumer protection statutes which adopt wording very similar to sec. 5 of the FTC
Act. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 480-482 (Supp. 1975); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 1-2
(West Cum. Supp. 1976-77); S.C. CODE ANN. § 66-71.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975). These
statutes specify that Federal Trade Commission and federal judicial decisions shall guide
interpretations of their provisions. E.g., id. § 66-71.1(b). The South Carolina Act expressly
permits consumer actions. Id. § 66-71.13(a). However, as yet there have been no reported
consumer cases under the South Carolina statute that was adopted in 1971.
3. 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
4. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). A list of
cases of this tenor can be found in Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir.
1973). 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(6) (West Supp. 1976) provides:
The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships,
or corporations ...
from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.
All attempts prior to 1970 by private litigants to imply a cause of action under the Act
were by injured competitors, rather than by consumers. Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the
Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582, 587 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
5. Rising public sentiment in favor of increased consumer protection by way of expanded consumer remedies against deceptive sales and advertising techniques has generated a substantial number of commentaries calling for the judicial implication of an
unqualified private cause of action under sec. 5 of the FTC Act. See, e.g., Gard, Purpose
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poration and Rich Plan of New Orleans, Inc., of its intention to
institute proceedings' against the corporations for violating section 5's prohibition of unfair competition and deceptive practices
in commerce. The corporations responded and executed a consent
agreement with the FTC on October 31, 1963.1 Among the practices found objectionable by the Commission were false representations concerning savings that could be made in connection with
the purchase of a freezer-food plan, the availability of freezer
servicing, and the attractiveness of company financing arrangements.8
Plaintiffs Eugene and Jacqueline Guernsey brought a class
action against defendant Rich Plan of the Midwest, a franchisee
of Rich Plan Corporation, and alleged injury from sales techniques identical to those condemned in the 1963 order. The court
assumed subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337.1 The
and Promise Unfulfilled: A Different View of Private Enforcement Under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 274 (1975); Lovett, PrivateActions for Deceptive Sales Practices, 23 AD. L. REv. 271 (1971); Note, A Private Right of Action Under
Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1268 (1971); Note,
PrivateRights of Action Under the FederalTrade Commission Act, 11 Hous. L. REV. 699
(1974). But see, Note, Implied Civil Remedies for Consumers Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 54 B.U.L. REV. 758 (1974); Comment, Private Enforcement and Rulemaking Under the Federal Trade CommissionAct: Expansion of FTC Responsibility, 69
Nw. U.L. REv. 462 (1974). The issue of implying a consumer remedy to enforce a prior
FTC consent order has received sparse treatment in these commentaries. E.g., 54 B.U.L.
REV., supra at 789-91; 69 Nw. U.L. REV., supra at 478 n.96.
6. For a discussion of the FTC's administrative enforcement procedure, see G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 49-163 (1924). See generally articles cited note
5 supra. A consent order results from the charged party's voluntary execution of an agreement with the FTC to cease and desist from the challenged practices. The defendant has
ten days to respond after receiving notice by the Commission and a copy of the complaint.
The alternative to settlement is a full adjudicatory proceeding before an administrative
law judge, with rights of appeal before the full Commission and beyond. A determination
in favor of the Commission prompts issuance of a formal cease and desist order. 16 C.F.R.
§§ 2.0-3.72 (Supp. 1976). See also 16E J. voN KALiNowsKx, BusmNss ORGANizATioNs §
39.05[6] (1977).
7. In re Rich Plan Corp., 63 F.T.C. 1099 (1963). The order, in part, directed:
That respondent Rich Plan Corporation, a corporation, and its officers, and
respondent Rich Plan of New Orleans, Inc., a corporation, and its officers, and
respondents' agents, representatives and employees, directly or through any
corporate or other device, in connection with the offering for sale, sale or distribution of freezers, food, or freezer-food plans in commerce, as "commerce" is
defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, do forthwith cease and desist
from: [various misrepresentations and deceptive sales gimmicks].
Id. at 1104-05.
8. Id.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) provides, "[tihe District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating
commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraint and monopolies." The court
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plaintiffs used the procedural device, the doctrine of implication,'0 to assert a cause of action under the Act. Although the
doctrine of implication, or a variation thereof, had been wielded
successfully by claimants to imply civil remedies under a number
of federal statutes," as well as under the United States Constitution, 2 courts prior to Guernsey had refused to apply it to the FTC
Act. For its formulation of the doctrine, the Guernsey court extrapolated from the cases of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the FederalBureau of Narcotics" and J.L Case Co. v.
Borak," and expressed the doctrine in the following form:
In order to imply a remedy under the doctrine, the court must
determine that
(1) the provision violated was designed to protect a class of
persons including the plaintiffs from the harm of which the
plaintiffs complain, and that
(2) it is appropriate in light of the statute's purposes to afford
plaintiffs the remedy sought."
noted that under § 1337 no minimum dollar amount is necessary and that "the language

of § 1337 applies to the Federal Trade Commission Act." 408 F. Supp. at 585. See also
Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 988 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Contra, Carlson
v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973).
10. See generally commentaries cited in note 5 supra. The doctrine originated in
Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854). See Note, Implying Civil Remedies from
FederalRegulatory Statutes, 77 Htav. L. REv. 285 (1963). The first American application
of the doctrine was in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), where the Court
considered the plight of an employee injured as a result of his employer's noncompliance
with the Federal Safety Appliance Act and declared, "[a] disregard of the command of
the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of a class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party
in default is implied .

. . ."

Id. at 39.

11. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (Voting Rights Act
of 1965); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S.
210 (1944) (Railway Labor Act); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (Federal
Safety Appliance Act); Gomez v. Florida State Empl. Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Wagner-Peyser Act); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947) (Communications Act of 1934).
12. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (fourth amendment).
13. Id. Bivens held that the plaintiff had stated a federal cause of action by alleging
the violation of his fourth amendment rights when federal agents, acting under color of
governmental authority, searched his apartment without a warrant and arrested him
without probable cause.
14. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Borak, the plaintiff stockholder succeeded in establishing
a private cause of action under sec. 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
defendant corporation had issued misleading proxy solicitations in violation of sec. 14(a)
of the statute. The Court emphasized that a primary purpose of the Act was the " 'protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary
to achieve that result." Id. at 432.
Published 15.
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It appeared clear to the court that the Guernseys met this twopronged test. However, the court was confronted still with the
problem of adverse precedent. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp."
and Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co.'7 had both rejected consumer attempts to imply remedies under the FTC Act, although each had
approached the issues from an entirely different perspective.
In Carlson, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the claim in peremptory-fashion. In that case, the plaintiffs had been hoodwinked by
a promotional game deceptively structured by the defendant to
deprive participants of prize money believed won. The court refused to assume section 1337 jurisdiction'8 absent demonstration
by plaintiffs of "a colorable right to a remedy under a particular
federal statute."' 9 Stare decisis appears to be the hidden rationale
(1967), may possibly lend more support for this particular formulation of the doctrine of
implication than Bivens or Borak. Further refinement of the doctrine has occurred in two
recent Supreme Court decisions both of which have refused to imply a private remedy.
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), held that a private cause of action was not consistent with
the congressional purpose underlying 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 & Supp. III) which imposed a
criminal penalty for corporate contributions to presidential and vice-presidential candidates. By unanimous decision, the Court distinguished Borak and Bivens and articulated
four criteria as guidelines for the implication of private remedies in future cases: 1) Does
the Statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff and members of his class, or is
it part of a pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant? 2) Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one? 3) Is implication of a remedy consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme? 4) Is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area of state concern, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? Id. at 80-85. The Court
accorded great weight to the fact that, in its view, protection of shareholders "was at best
a subsidiary purpose" of the statute. Id. at 81.
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977), the Court refused to imply
a cause of action for damages in favor of an unsuccessful tender offeror under sec. 14(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Williams Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C.
§78 n(e). Plaintiff alleged that antifraud violations by its competitors had frustrated its
attempts to gain control of Piper Aircraft Corporation. The Court applied the Cort implication test and concluded that the legislative history of the Williams Act compelled a
ruling dictating that the purpose of the amended statute was to protect shareholders by
insuring full disclosure rather than to protect a competing tender offeror. Id. at 4192-93.
However, a strong dissent by Justices Brennan and Stevens indicated their adherence to
a more liberal view of implying civil remedies, at least where it is apparent that the
plaintiffs merit some degree of private protection under the statutory scheme. Id. at 4196201. Compare the Cort doctrine of implication with that utilized by the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia at note 24 infra.
16. 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
17. 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973).
18. Note 9 supra.
19. Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973). The court summarily
concluded that "it]he statutory provision invoked by appellants in this case provided
them with no direct remedy, either explicitly or implicitly." Id.
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for the Carlsonholding. But the long list of cases cited as authority for the decision, with the possible exception of Holloway, does
not dispose of the plaintiffs' claim as easily as the court's opinion
implies. 2 The court concluded that "[t]he protection against
unfair trade practices afforded by the Act vests initial remedial
power solely in the Federal Trade Commission.

' 21

It is possible

that due to Carlson'suse of these qualifying words, the Guernsey
court did not consider it necessary to distinguish or otherwise
treat that case in its opinion. Since the 1963 consent order represented initial action by the FTC in the Guernsey case, the court
might have distinguished Carlsonon that basis had it so desired.
In approaching the complex question of a consumer remedy
under the FTC Act, the Holloway court is noteworthy for its
exhaustive policy analysis.2 1 Consumer plaintiffs in Holloway
decried defendant Bristol-Myers' use of misleading advertisements depicting its analgesic Excedrin as more effective than its
less expensive competitors. The court applied a more demanding
doctrine of implication test2 than did Guernsey and noted that
20. Most of the cases cited treated the issue in dicta and relied on Moore v. New York
Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926), which treated the entire question by saying, "There is
an attempt to allege unfair methods of competition, which may be put aside at once since
relief in such cases under the Trade Commission Act must be afforded in the first instance
by the Commission." Id. at 603. Note that Moore's use of qualifying language, "in the
first instance," seems to imply that in cases where the Commission has already acted,
private relief would not be precluded necessarily. See Note, Implied Civil Remedies for
Consumers Under the FederalTrade CommissionAct, 54 B.U.L. REv. 758, 783 (1974). The
fact that Moore was decided prior to the 1938 amendments to the FTC Act has discredited
it further. See Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 281-83 (9th Cir. 1973) (Solomon,
J., dissenting).
21. Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
22. An indication of the impact of Holloway can be gleaned from the commentaries
cited in note 5 supra. All of the cited articles that considered the question of an implied
private remedy under the FTC Act after Holloway was decided in 1973 contain some
discussion of the decision; most is unfavorable. For a defense of the Holloway decision,
see Comment, Private Enforcement and Rulemaking Under the FederalTrade Commission Act: Expansion of FTC Responsibilities, 69 Nw. U.L. Rav. 462 (1974). Cf. Note,
Implied Civil Remedies for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 54
B.U.L. Rav. 758 (1974).
23. The foundations of the doctrine were framed as follows:
(1) A Federal statutory or constitutional prohibition against the acts complained of; (2) inclusion of the defendant in the class upon which the duty of
statutory compliance has been imposed; (3) legislative intent to place the
party claiming injury within the ambit of the statute's protection or to confer a
substantive benefit or immunity upon him; (4) injury or threatened harm
proximately resulting from the defendant's breach of duty; and (5) unavailability or ineffectiveness of alternative avenues of redress.
Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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even if the doctrine's technical requirements were met by plaintiffs, "[t]hese factors are necessary but not sufficient conditions,
and their combined presence does not automatically warrant the
implication of a private right of action." 4 In addition to the technical requirements of the doctrine, it was necessary to determine
whether or not the implication of a private remedy under the Act
would upset the "delicate balance of federal and state, public and
private interests"" contained in the statutory scheme, keeping in
view the social objectives sought to be advanced by Congress. On
the one hand, Holloway weighed the social aims manifested by
Congress in the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendments20 to the Act and
tempered this interest by its conception of the legislative intent
underlying the amendments. Juxtaposed with this consumer interest were legitimate business interests, the necessity for the
orderly evolution of precedent and commercial standards, and a
desire to avoid unnecessary litigation. Relying heavily on its assessment of the legislative intent" behind both the original 1914
24. Id.
25. Id. Note that Holloway's concern for the balanced nature of the legislative scheme
constituted a distinct element in that court's analysis, whereas, with the current Supreme
Court's approach to the implication of civil remedies, the legislative scheme is treated as
part and parcel of the implication doctrine. See note 15 supra; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,
84 (1975).
26. Pub. L. No. 447, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938). The amendment added to sec. 5 of the
1914 Act the proscription of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." The
Holloway court conceded that "[tihe Wheeler-Lea Amendments represented a shift in
emphasis from the control of deceptive advertising practices as an incident of antitrust
regulation to the avowed purpose of protecting the consumer from fraud." 485 F.2d at 994.
27. Holloway repeatedly emphasized that no language in the Act permitted an inference of a specific congressional intent to bestow private remedies upon consumers. This
approach has been criticized for its failure to consider adequately that the primary purpose of the 1938 amendments was to protect the consumer. That the court focused upon
the somewhat ancillary and administrative designs of the Act, chiefly its procedural
enforcement scheme, at the expense of the Act's primary remedial purpose, has been the
subject of criticism. See Note, PrivateRights of Action Under the FederalTrade Commission Act, 11 Hous. L. Rzv. 699 (1974), which draws a distinction between the inference of
congressional intent and congressional purpose, in the Holloway analytical context. In J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the Supreme Court relied heavily on the apparent
policy objective of the Securities Exchange Act to protect investors from misleading proxy
solicitations. Perhaps the better approach to the question of legislative intent in a situation like Holloway, where legislative history yields no unequivocal indication, would be
to regard congressional inaction, as opposed to express or implied preclusion of a private
remedy, as a tacit deference to the longstanding judicial function of implying private
remedy where reasonably necessary to effectuate the primary purpose of the statute. The
Supreme Court has hinted that it may partially subscribe to such an approach. "In
situations in which it is clear that federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights,
it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action, although an
explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be controlling." Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
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Act and the 1938 amendments, the court finally resolved its analysis in favor of its misgivings, "A fair reading of the statute and
its legislative history evinces a plain intent by Congress to make
the administrative program for enforcing the Federal Trade Commission Act an exclusive one."2 Thus, the Holloway court determined that private enforcement of the broadly framed prohibitions of section 5(a) of the FTC Act would unbearably inhibit the
administrative discretion deliberately vested in the FTC to proceed against what it considered to be violations of the Act. No
exceptions were posited, and the ruling appeared to proscribe
private actions in toto.
Blanket preclusion of private remedies in Holloway did not
deter the United States District Court in Guernsey. The latter
court did not directly assail the force of Holloway's logic, but
instead attempted to distinguish Holloway on its facts. Having
introduced the doctrine of implication, the court in Guernsey
then discussed the demonstrated ineffectiveness of the FTC as an
enforcement agency.29 Stressing resource limitations as a cause of
the Commission's inability to secure compliance with its cease

and desist orders, the court concluded that "the efficacy of the
Federal Trade Commission in acting to deter consumer fraud is
suspect. Most defrauded customers have no remedy at all
...
-M For an example, the court mentioned the experience of
Holland Furnace Company against whom a cease and desist order
66, 82 (1975). Similarly, one commentator has remarked, "In Bivens [403 U.S. 388
(1971)], the Supreme Court implied a private right of action under the fourth amendment. That case illustrates the irrelevance of legislative intent to the doctrine of implication inasmuch as it cannot seriously be contended that the founding fathers intended
private enforcement of that amendment." Gard, Purposeand PromiseFulfilled: A Different View of Private Enforcement Under the FederalTrade Commission Act, 70 Nw. U.L.
REV. 274, 286 (1975). For a discussion of the legislative history of the FTC Act, see
generally articles cited note 5 supra; G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 148 (1924); Lang, The Legislative History of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 13
WASHBURN L.J. 6 (1973).
28. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d at 1002.
29. 408 F. Supp. at 586-87. Criticism of the FTC's enforcement capabilities is legion.
See, e.g., E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE "NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 35-96 (1969); G. HENDERSON, Tan FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924); Report
of the American Bar Association to Study the Federal Trade Commission (1969); Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 663 (1970); White, F.T.C.: Wrong
Agency for the Job of Adjudication, 61 A.B.A.J. 1242 (1975). Many commentators have
also pointed out the extreme difficulty in sustaining a consumer cause of action against
deceptive advertising under state consumer action statutes and through common law tort
actions. See generally articles cited note 5 supra.
30. 408 F. Supp. at 586.
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had remained unenforced for twenty-nine years.3'
By emphasizing the lack of redress for injured consumers, the
Guernsey court implicitly revealed that it substantially equated
32
consumer protection with modern notions of the public interest.
Holloway had glossed over recurrent calls for expanded consumer
remedies, directing its attentions to the legislative intent behind
the 1914 and 1938 Acts and basing its inference of congressional
intent on the balanced nature of the statutory scheme. However,
this particular focus caused the Holloway court to lose sight of the
broad remedial purposes of the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendments.
Holloway had neglected to balance adequately the consumer interest in its interpretation of the Act. This interest has been gathering increasing momentum since the 1938 amendments. In contrast, the Guernsey court disclosed its more pragmatic view of the
remedial character of the FTC Act by avoiding strained attempts
to discern legislative intent and by focusing instead upon the
Commission's apparent inability to effectuate the purpose of the
amended statute, the protection of the consumer from deceptive
marketing techniques. Since business methods and marketing
strategy have become more refined and sophisticated over the
years, sometimes in deliberate response to attempted regulation,
the need to protect the victimized consumer has increased correspondingly. Thus, the Guernsey court articulated its balancing
test in a different manner than the Holloway court had. "In
weighing the benefits to the consumer against any possible damage to the Federal Trade Commission's role in 'providing certainty and specificity to the broad proscriptions of the Act',.
the court must opt in favor of the consuming public."'34
Guernsey distinguished Holloway on two factual grounds.
Unlike Holloway, in which the plaintiffs' injuries consisted only
of the difference between the cost of Excedrin and the cost of its
less expensive but equally effective substitutes, the plaintiffs in
Guernsey suffered substantial financial damage. 5 In addition,
31. In re Holland Furnace Co., 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
924 (1965).
32. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(b) (West Supp. 1976), empowers the Commission to act only
"if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be
to the interest of the public." See FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
33. Pub. L. No. 447, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938). See note 26 supra.
34. 408 F. Supp. at 588 (quoting Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d at 998).
35. In addition to injunctive relief, the Guernseys were seeking $1,300 actual damages
and $1,000,000 damages for the injured class. The measure of damages presumably would
be the difference between the value of the goods and services advertised and the value of
those actually received under the freezer-food plan.
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the court recognized that the previous FTC order against Rich
Plan Corporation largely removed the force of Holloway's reasoning from the facts at bar. Mrs. Holloway had attempted to initiate a de novo judicial inquiry into the legality of Bristol-Myers'
practices, whereas the Guernseys could and did allege the administrative discretion that was reflected in the FTC's consent order.
Although the defendant in Guernsey was not a named target of
the consent order, the court, nonetheless, noted that plaintiffs
had alleged that defendant Rich Plan of the Midwest operated as
a franchise of the Rich Plan Corporation. On its face, the order
had applied to agents, employees, or representatives of Rich Plan
Corporation.3 6 Hence, the instant defendant, Rich Plan of the
Midwest, was to the court's satisfaction sufficiently identifiable
with Rich Plan Corporation to be regarded as a party to the order.
The court also reasoned that the activities of the defendant, being
nearly identical to those proscribed in the consent order, "would
fall within the class defined in the consent decree.""7
That the Commission had determined at one point that the
defendant's alleged practices were illegal was, in the Guernsey
court's view, dispositive of the case. Holloway's interest analysis
had treated the FTC's quasi-judicial and advisory role in the
statutory framework as a congressional design. Consequently,
36. In re Rich Plan Corp., 63 F.T.C. 1099, 1104 (1963).
37. 408 F. Supp. at 587. The exact scope of the court's holding is unclear because of
the court's failure to clarify whether the defendant's principal link with the 1963 order
stemmed from its identity as a franchise or from the similarity of the alleged conduct to
that proscribed in the order. Assuming that the limited private remedy under the FTC
Act is to be amplified judicially in future cases, this distinction will have to be refined
further. For example, the court seemed to suggest that defendant's culpability lay chiefly
in the degree of the similarity of its alleged practices to those previously condemned. Id.
If this is so, logical extension of this rationale would give consent orders the status of
substantive legal precedent, and the fact that the Guernsey defendant was a franchisee
of Rich Plan Corporation would lose its legal significance other than in terms of notice.
Similarly, if Guernsey's holding is read broadly - that is, to permit private actions
whenever the FTC had previously ruled conduct violative of sec. 5 - consumer suits to
redress injuries suffered due to violations of cease and desist orders and trade regulation
rules would appear to be sanctioned. The court's sweeping rationale seems to suggest this
broad reading. On the other hand, a narrow construction of the holding would limit private
enforcement to cases in which consumer injuries had resulted from noncompliance with
the terms of a consent order by a party to the order or some party substantially identifiable
with the transgressor. Routinely, consent agreements contain a provision that "the signing
of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission
by respondents that the law has been violated." In re Rich Plan Corp., 63 F.T.C. 1099,
1103 (1963). Narrowly construed, Guernsey's holding is not inconsistent with this provision inasmuch as the compensable injury flows from noncompliance with the order itself,
rather than from a violation of the FTC Act in a pure sense.
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usurpation of the Commission's role by a court lacking the Commission's "expertise and knowledge of business practices"3
should be avoided if at all possible. Part of the FTC's discretionary enforcement duty is to "gauge the injury a deceptive practice
will cause to the public and to balance this against the likely cost
of elimination of the practice."" To the extent that this function
is not usurped and the Commission first performs in its discretionary capacity, no harm is done to the deliberately wrought
legislative balance which concerned Holloway. Inasmuch as the
FTC had initiated proceedings in 1963 against Rich Plan Corporation for the same practices that were to reappear later on the
Guernsey record, it had to that degree utilized its special administrative competence. 0 The defendant in Guernsey, moreover, as
a franchisee of Rich Plan Corporation, was arguably on notice of
the 1963 consent order directed against its franchisor. Mrs. Holloway, on the other hand, could only allege that she was victimized
by illegal business practices under section 5, and her forum was
not willing to inquire into the substantive accuracy of her claim.
Because Guernsey limits the court's role to after-the-fact enforcement, the brunt of Holloway's rationale against implication
of a civil remedy is inapposite to the Guernsey situation. A federal
court's appropriate role in providing supplemental remedies
under a federal statute such as the FTC Act requires that it
remain sensitive to the plethora of policy values embodied in the
final legislative enactment. At the same time, the court must
engage in a determination of whether or not judicial intervention
in the particular case is warranted in order to further a strong
congressional policy encompassing the Act as a whole. While the
result of Holloway's analysis is subject to criticism for being an
inadequate judicial response to the broad legislative purposes of
the FTC Act,4 ' Guernsey can be no less vulnerable to criticism for
38. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d at 998.
39. 408 F. Supp. at 588.
40. Throughout its opinion, the Guernsey court used the terms "consent order" and
"cease and desist order" interchangeably, ignoring the technical distinction between these
remedial devices. See note 6 supra. Arguably, the administrative discretion underlying a
consent order is not as extensive as that behind a formal cease and desist order issued
upon completion of a full administrative hearing. Yet it is equally arguable that the
Commission's expert deliberations are largely complete once it has undertaken to challenge certain practices under sec. 5 of the FTC Act. The additional element present in a

cease and desist order but which is lacking in the case of a consent order might be
described simply as the respondent's choice to perfect fully its due process right to a full

hearing before the Commission.
41. See note 27 and text accompanying notes 33 & 34 supra.
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its lack of a deliberate policy analysis. Yet Guernsey's ruling,
admittedly an exercise of quasi-legislative power, remains within
the parameters of the principles of federalism and separation of
powers which inhibit the lawmaking prerogatives of the federal
judiciary. The strong federal policy that Guernsey seeks to promote, by allowing supplementary enforcement of the FTC's final
orders, permeates the amended FTC Act. With respect to the
often exercised but seldom acknowledged coordinate lawmaking
power43 of the federal courts, one commentator has observed:
That the court associates the remedy with a statutory provision
affects the arguments for and against judicial lawmaking. The
weaknesses of the court as lawmaker-the lack of debates and
hearings, the retroactive effect of its solution, the uncertainty of
its public mandate-are less serious when conduct has already
been proscribed by the legislature and only an additional remedy is sought."
The FTC is expressly authorized by statute to define the permissible limits of business behavior under section 5 of the Act. Once
the Commission has indicated its disapproval of specific practices
in a consent agreement, and the federal court's ruling creates only
a limited supplemental remedy, the traditional arguments
against this form of judicial activism lose most of their force.
Having distinguished Holloway to its satisfaction, the
Guernsey court proceeded to attack the Holloway holding as overbroad. 5 As a final step in its reasoning, Guernsey sought to discredit Holloway's blanket preclusion of private consumer remedies under the FTC Act.4" Holloway had held essentially that
FTC jurisdiction over unfair trade practices under section 5 was
exclusive.47 This conclusion was reached, the Guernsey court said,
"without any citation of authority." What Guernsey apparently
42. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Note, Implied Civil Remedies for
Consumers Under the FederalTrade CommissionAct, 54 B.U.L. REv. 758, 767-68 (1974).
43. Note, Implying Civil Remedies from FederalRegulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L.
REv. 285, 291 (1963).

44. Id. Justice Harlan, concurring in Bivens, 403 U.S. 388. 398 (1971), and commenting upon J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), remarked, "The notion of 'implying'
a remedy, therefore, as applied to cases like Borak, can only refer to a process whereby
the federal judiciary exercises a choice among traditionally available judicial remedies
according to reasons related to the substantive social policy embodied in an act of positive
law." 403 U.S. at 402-03 n.4.
45. 408 F. Supp. at 588.
46. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d at 1002.
47. Id.
48. 408 F. Supp. at 588.
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overlooked is that the Holloway court based its conclusion not
upon precedent,but upon its own analysis of the statute, especially its reading of the Act's legislative history and congressional
intent. However, Guernsey was correct in its assertion that the
Commission's jurisdiction "has been held to be primary rather
than exclusive."49 This distinction had heretofore been of no
moment, but in Guernsey a determination that the FTC's enforcement jurisdiction was purely exclusive may have justified
the dismissal of plaintiffs' claim. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction,5" a creature of administrative law, would not bar a private action to enforce an outstanding FTC ruling that defendant's practices were illegal under section 5.
Only once in its opinion did the Guernsey court directly criticize the reasoning of Holloway. In its discussion of the Holloway
conception of the FTC as an expert tribunal vested with discretion to balance the injurious impact of a deceptive practice
against the social costs of its elimination, the court noted that
Holloway's preoccupation with the Commission's statutory role
caused it to "ignore the basic premise of the free enterprise economy-that consumers should have the opportunity to choose between competing merchants on the basis of price, quality, and
service."'" This appears to be a valid criticism and supports the
argument" that Holloway had neglected to consider sufficiently
the broad protective purposes of the amended FTC Act in its
analysis. But this criticism should not be read as a Guernsey
attempt to discredit the applicability of Holloway's rationale to
its own facts, inasmuch as these remarks were made in the context of Guernsey's criticism that the Holloway holding was overbroad. If a future plaintiff, in a Holloway type situation where no
previous FTC determination had taken place, should seek stand49. Id. (citing Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926)). Both Moore
and Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973), can be read to support this
position. See note 20 and text accompanying note 21 supra.See also LaSalle Street Press,
Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (N.D. fll. 1968) (private
litigants may not seek relief under this statute because the [Federal Trade] Commission
has original jurisdiction).
50. The doctrine, in general terms, requires courts to refrain from deciding issues
falling within a sphere of regulation reserved by Congress to a particular administrative
body until such time as that body, utilizing its special competence, has resolved the issues.
E.g., Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
51. 408 F. Supp. at 588 (citing Gard, Purpose and Promise Unfulfilled: A Different
View of PrivateEnforcement Under the FederalTrade CommissionAct, 70 Nw. U.L. Ray.
274, 282-83 (1975)).
52. See note 27 supra.
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ing under section 5 of the FTC Act, the court, in all likelihood,
would distinguish Guernsey and apply Holloway's rationale to
dismiss the plaintiffs claim. Guernsey's holding is indeed narrow
in the sense that the court distinguished Holloway instead of
attempting directly to remove the decision's logical underpinnings.
The recently enacted Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act 3 does not alter significantly
the force of the Guernsey court's rationale. Admittedly, one of the
Magnuson Act's foremost purposes is to "provide the Federal
Trade Commission.

.

.with means of better protecting consum-

ers." 54 To this end, the Commission's authority to promulgate
substantive rules 5 defining certain unfair or deceptive commercial practices is clarified and confirmed, and the Commission is
empowered to bring civil actions against knowing violators of a
cease and desist order to obtain compensation for injured consumers.56 Again, however, as in the 1938 amendments, there is no
indication of a congressional intent to exclude any private actions
which might be judicially implied, other than that detected in the
strained reasoning of Holloway.57 The narrow Guernsey ruling
should simply be regarded as creating a convenient adjunct to
assist the harried Commission in its enforcement duties, allowing
the FTC to concentrate its resources more fully on performance
of its specialized administrative tasks.
The Magnuson Act, nevertheless, may furnish a source of
reference for the development of judicial limitations upon the
standing concept enunciated in Guernsey. Section 5(m), for ex53. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 45-77 (West
Supp. 1976)) [Hereinafter cited as Magnuson Act]. The court in Guernsey simply made
reference to the Magnuson Act and stated that it "does not alter the Federal Trade
Commission Act as it relates to suits of this type." 408 F. Supp. at 587.
54. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD.NEWS 7702.
55. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a (West Supp. 1976). The FTC's statutory authority to promulgate substantive rules was first judicialy recognized in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n
v. FTC, 485 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 951 (1974). Sec. 19 authorizes
the Commission to obtain compensation for consumers injured by violations of these rules.
15 U.S.C.A. § 57b (West Supp. 1976).
56. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57b (West Supp. 1976).
57. That is, a negative implication arose from the fact that legislation which would
have allowed private encorcement had been proposed but not adopted. Holloway v.
Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d at 994-97. See note 27 supra. Note that sec. 19 of the new
Act expressly states that "[r]emedies provided in this section are in addition to, and not
in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal law." 15
U.S.C.A. § 57b(e) (West Supp. 1976).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 6
[Vol. 28
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

ample, requires a showing of actual or objectively implicit knowledge by a rule violator before the Commission can recover a civil
penalty." When the FTC seeks a penalty against a violator of a
final cease and desist order, it must demonstrate that the violator
has actual knowledge that the particular practice is unfair or
deceptive and unlawful.5 9 The success of Commission actions to
obtain compensation for consumers, however, hinges upon proof
"that the act or practice to which the cease and desist order
relates is one which a reasonable man would have known under
-0 Thus, the
the circumstances was dishonest or fradulent. . ...
degree of scienter required for consumer redress appears to be less
than that necessary for exaction of a civil penalty. Since scienter
in Guernsey was implicit in the existing franchise relationship, it
was not necessary for the court to address that specific issue."1 It
appears likely that constitutional due process will be a factor in
the ultimate judicial demarcation of the appropriate standard
with respect to rule as well as order violations.
Private enforcement of consent orders, as distinguished from
the enforcement of final cease and desist orders, may become a
salient issue in future cases. Although Guernsey dealt with a
consent agreement, its reasoning might apply even more forcefully to a cease and desist order issued after a full adjudicatory
determination of the illegality of the practices." The Magnuson
Act appears to take into account this distinction." A further criticism of Guernsey might be made on the ground that the holding
may serve to discourage future settlements by raising the possibility of subsequent private litigation against the settling party.
Since the consent order procedure is an important element of the
statutory scheme, Guernsey would prove disruptive of the enforcement scheme if it had this impact. Yet this criticism presupposes that the defendant in a consent agreement seeks to continue
the challenged practices with impunity; to the extent that the
58. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(m)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1976).

59. Id. at § 45(m)(1)(B).
60. Id. at § 57b(a)(2). Note that with such damage actions, however, the statute
limits recovery to actual damages. Id. at § 57b(b).
61. See text accompanying notes 36 & 37 supra.This consideration might have been
deemed unnecessary by the court because it was ruling merely on defendant's motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. 408 F. Supp. at 585.
62. See note 40 supra.

63. Sec. 5(m) appears to contemplate a full adjudicatory determination before the
Commission. Sec. 5(1), however, would appear to be equally applicable to consent orders.
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 45(l)-45(m) (West Supp. 1976).
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party intends to abide by the terms of the order, he need fear
neither a serious private suit nor an enforcement suit by the Commission. The fact remains that the party to a consent order can
present scant legal justification for a subsequent violation of the
order's terms. Whatever Guernsey's implications eventually
prove to be, it seems that the FTC Act, in the near future, may
cease to be "an empty promise to consumers.""
William C. Guida
64. 408 F. Supp. at 588. One decision rendered after Guernsey refused to allow a
private action where defendants had violated an FTC consent order. Bott v. Holiday
Universal, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1976-2 Trade Cas.) 60,973 at 69,301 (D.D.C. July
14, 1976). The court simply refused to acknowledge the factual similarity to Guernsey and
reaffirmed Holloway, which was also decided in the District of Columbia Circuit. In a
brief, passing reference to Guernsey, the court remarked, "[tihis decision. . . is contrary
to the legislative history and intent of the FTC Act and subsequent amendments, as
explained in the Holloway decision." Id. at 69,302. Recent legislation proposed by
Representative Bob Eckhardt (D-Tex.) would allow injured consumers and competitors
to bring civil actions against violators of trade regulation rules and cease and desist orders.
H.R. 1767, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). There is some indication that the FTC soon may
be willing to support this or similar legislation. See 801 AN'rrRusT & TRDE REG. REP.
(BNA) A-5, 6 (Feb. 15, 1977).
This writer gratefully acknowledges the assistance of David B. Dempsey, a 1977
graduate of the University of South Carolina School of Law.
*Editor's Note-As this Comment goes to press, the Ninth Circuit has handed down
an opinion allowing consumers to bring private actions based on the doctrine of implication. In Kipperman v. Academy Life Insurance Co., No. 75-3345 (9th Cir., filed May 24,
1977) (affirming dismissal of claim on other grounds), the court granted § 1337 jurisdiction
from 39 U.S.C. 3009, a statute prohibiting the mailing of unordered merchandise, to allow
a consumer declaratory and, if necessary, restitutionary relief for the ubsolicited mailing
of insurance promotional materials. This limited private right was permitted despite the
language of § 3009(a) that a violation of 39 U.S.C. 3009 is an unfair trade practice under
15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1). See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
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THE BLUE PENCIL RULE AS

APPLIED IN SOUTH CAROLINA TO COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE

This comment examines the status of the South Carolina law
pertaining to partial enforcement of employment covenants not
to compete and offers guidelines in drafting these covenants. Decisions involving covenants not to compete ancillary to the sale
of a business are considered to the extent they affect drafting
covenants between the employee and employer. After it has been
determined that a covenant contains an unreasonable time or
geographic restriction,' the court must decide whether to enforce
the covenant to a reasonable extent. Before one can analyze the
South Carolina decisions addressing this subject, it is necessary
to outline the basic principles in this area.
THE BLUE PENCIL RULE

When the time, space, or activity restriction in a covenant
not to compete exceeds that which the court considers reasonable,
the issue of severability arises. This problem can be illustrated by
the following covenant:
Employee agrees not to engage in competition with the employer in the exterminating business in cities A, B, and C and
all territory within a 25 mile radius of each city.

If the employee had been assigned only to cities A and B, the
court may determine that the inclusion of city C is unreasonable.
The court then must consider whether to sever city C and enforce
the remainder of the covenant. The traditional statement of the
test of severability is contained in the blue pencil rule.' The elements of this rule 3were expressed in the English decision of
Attwood v. Lamont:
Covenants of this kind are severable where the severance can be
effected by striking out restrictions which are excessive with
1. For a discussion of the criteria used in South Carolina to determine the issue of
reasonableness, see Note, Enforceabilityof Covenants not to Compete ContainingUnreasonable, Indivisible Restrictions as to Georaphic Area, 11 S.C.L.Q. 343 (1959).
2. 5 S. WiLLSTON, CONTRACTS § 1659 (Rev. ed. 1937).
3. Attwood v. Lamont, [1920] 2 K.B. 146, rev. [1920] 3 K.B. 571 (C.A.).
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respect to area or subject matter or classes of customers, provided any such restriction is so expressed that it can be dealt
with as a separate negative obligation, but the courts will not
split up a single restriction expressed in indivisible terms...
the court will sever in a proper case where the severance can be
performed by a blue pencil but not otherwise.'
Subsequent English cases have refined the blue pencil rule
by requiring not only that the unenforceable clause be stated
separately in order that it can be stricken from the covenant but
also that the excessive limitation be merely an additional stipulation unessential to the purpose of the contract.' Unless both of
these prerequisites are satisfied, the entire covenant fails even if
the excessive restraint could be severed.6
The American Law Institute places paramount importance
on whether the covenant is divisible in form:
Where a promise in reasonable restraint of trade in a bargain
has added to it a promise in unreasonable restraint, the former
promise is enforceable unless the entire agreement is part of a
plan to obtain a monopoly; but if full performance of a promise
indivisible in terms would involve unreasonable restraint the
promise is illegal and is not enforceable even for so much of the
performance as would be a reasonable restraint.7
Although the majority view of the American courts is said to be
in accord with the position adopted by the American Law Institute, 8 "[t]he law on the question of rewriting a covenant not to
compete to excise overbroad restrictions is still developing."'
The most recent American cases have evidenced a tendency
to enforce an indivisible covenant to a lawful extent." This view
has been adopted by Williston" and Corbin"2 as the better ap4. Id. at 155 (Bailhache, J.).
5. British Reinforced Concrete Eng. Co. v. Schelif, [1921] 2 Ch. 563, 91 L.J. Ch. 114,
(h.s.) (Younger, L.J.); 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1659 (Rev. ed. 1937).
6. 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1659 (Rev. ed. 1937).
7. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 518 (1932).
8. See generally 6A A. ComIN, CONTRaACTS § 1390 (1951).
9. Alders v. AFA Corp. of Fla., 353 F. Supp. 654, 658 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 490 F.2d 990

(5th Cir. 1973).
10. E.g., USAchem, Inc. v. Goldstein, 512 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1975); Alexander &

Alexander, Inc. v. Drayton, 378 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 505 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1974);
Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Jacobson & Co. v. Inter-

national Environment Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967); Weatherford Oil Tool Co.
v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950 (1960).

11. 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1660 (Rev. ed. 1937). Although Professor Williston
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proach. The rationale underlying this position rejects a dependence on form where differences in the wording of agreements
identical in substance would result in the partial enforcement of

one covenant, but in the complete invalidity of another. 3 This
situation is illustrated by the following covenant: "Employee
agrees not to engage in competition with the employer in the
exterminating business in County D." This covenant is indivisi-

ble in its terms, and the traditional blue pencil rule could not be
applied even though County D may be composed exclusively of
cities A, B, and C. Therefore, a covenant that names each city
individually could be given partial enforcement by striking the
excessive area; however, the covenant naming only County D
would be indivisible and totally void. The modern trend is not to
consider the question of divisibility; under this view the covenant
naming only County D would be enforced to a reasonable extent. 4
The primary objection to the blue pencil rule is that it encourages employers, often having superior bargaining power, to
extract unreasonable restrictions:
Courts should, however, be hesitant to tailor overly broad
covenants. This is especially true where large employers are
involved. If severance is easily afforded, employers will be able
to limit greatly employee mobility by fashioning ominous covenants with confidence that, if challenged, they will be pared
drafted § 518 of the Restatement of Contracts,he subsequently changed his view: "I have
concluded and have so stated in §1660 of the Revised edition of my treatise on Contracts
in spite of the contrary rule stated in §518 of the Restatement of Contracts, that in such
a case the unquestionably legal part of this covenant should be enforced." Williston, A
Note on Beit v. Belt, 23 CONN. B.J. 40, 41 (1949).
12. 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1390 (1951). Professor Corbin has argued that adoption of this position is not equivalent to drafting a new contract:
This is not making a new contract for the parties; it is a choice among the
possible effects of the one that they made, establishing the one that is the most
desirable for the contractors and the public at large. Partial enforcement involves much less of a variation from the effects intended by the parties than
total non-enforcement would.
Corbin, A Comment on Belt v. Beit, 23 CONN. B.J. 43, 50 (1949).
13. 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1660 (Rev. ed. 1937).
14. This point is expressed colorfully in Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 351
A.2d 250 (1976):
The man who wildly claims that he owns all the cherry trees in the county
cannot be denied protection of the orchard in his backyard. A restrictive covenant, when it comes under the scrutiny of a court of equity, will be held to
reasonable geographical and chronological boundaries, according to the realities
of the situation.
Id. at 596 n.8, 351 A.2d at 255 n.8 (quoting Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v. Hout, 416 Pa.
222, 224, 206 A2d 59, 60 (1965)).
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down and enforced when the facts of a particular case are not
unreasonable.' 5
STATUS OF THE BLUE PENCIL RULE IN SOUTH CAROLINA: EARLY
DECISIONS

Carroll v. Giles'" is the earliest South Carolina Supreme
Court decision involving a restrictive covenant not to compete.
The plaintiff furnished to the defendant the necessary items for
a barber shop and the defendant agreed to refrain from working
as a barber for anyone else or opening a shop for himself in Bennettsville at any time. The court, per Justice McGowan, held that
the unlimited time stipulation was unreasonable and, consequently, the covenant could not be enforced."7 The court did not
discuss the possibility of limiting the time restriction to a reasonable extent.
The question of the validity of a restrictive covenant not to
compete, ancillary to a sale of a business and its goodwill, came
before the court in Metts v. Wenb erg.'5 In consideration for selling
the business, the defendant agreed not to engage directly or indirectly in the barber trade for five years within the city of Orangeburg. Because this covenant was determined to be reasonable, the
court was precluded from reaching the issue of partial enforcement. Several years later in Reeves v. Sargeant,11 the court again
upheld a covenant included in a contract for the sale of a photography business with its trade name and goodwill. The seller had
agreed never to engage in the same business in Richland County.
These earlier cases provided little if any precedent for the supreme court when it faced the decision of whether to apply the
blue pencil rule to employment covenants not to compete.

15. Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing with Restrictive Covenants Under FederalLaw, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1199-1200 (1973); accord
Blake, Employment Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HAv. L. Ray. 625, 683-84 (1960).
Professor Blake believes, however, that the judicial blue pencil should be used if the
covenant is drafted carefully and in good faith and is tailored to the facts concerning the
business and the individual employee. Id. at 681. See also Alders v. AFA Corp. of Fla.,
353 F. Supp. 654, 658 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 490 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1973).
16. 30 S.C. 412, 9 S.E. 422 (1889).
17. Id. at 418-19, 9 S.E. at 423.
18. 158 S.C. 411, 155 S.E. 734 (1930).
19. 200 S.C. 494, 21 S.E.2d 184 (1942).
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RECENT DECISIONS

In Delmar Studios of the Carolinas v. Kinsey,"0 the South
Carolina Supreme Court, applying North Carolina law, refused to
uphold a covenant in an employment contract in which the employee, a photographer, had agreed not to engage in competition
with the employer for a period of two years from the date of
employment termination. The employee was not to become interested financially in the solicitation of business from schools
within a territory covering three-fourths of North Carolina, all of
South Carolina, and eleven counties in Georgia.21 The employer's
business extended into all of these areas; the employee, however,
had worked exclusively in ten South Carolina counties and in six
Georgia counties." The court, per Justice Oxner, refused to blue
pencil the areas in which the employee did not work and concluded that the territorial limits of the restrictive covenant were
broader than reasonably necessary for the protection of Delmar's
business. Refusing to divide the territory and thus enforcing what
it considered would be a new contract, the court stated that the
contract "must stand or fall integrally. ' ' "s The decision relied
heavily on the North Carolina case of Noe v. McDevitt. 4
During the same term as the Delmar Studios decision, the
supreme court considered the case of Somerset v. Reyner. The
covenant not to compete was contained in an option agreement.
Under the terms of the instrument, the plaintiff agreed in further
consideration of the sale not to engage in retail selling of jewelry,
silverware, or similar items in South Carolina for a period of
twenty years. The trade of the business was confined basically to
the Columbia area. The court, therefore, had an opportunity as
20. 233 S.C. 313, 104 S.E.2d 338 (1958).
21. Id. at 316, 104 S.E.2d at 339.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 324, 104 S.E.2d at 344.
24. 228 N.C. 242, 45 S.E.2d 121 (1947). In this case, the plaintiff was engaged in the
business of selling equipment and supplies used in the operation of beauty salons. The
defendant was employed as a salesman in North Carolina and South Carolina. He had
agreed in his contract of employment that he would not work as a salesman in a similar
business or in the same territory for a period of five years following termination of his
employment. Although his territory covered both states, the defendant worked exclusively
in the eastern district of North Carolina. The court held the covenant to be void since the
territory covered in the covenant was too extensive for the reasonable protection of the
plaintiff's business. The plaintiff had not demonstrated that the inclusion of the broad
territory would correlate with the protection needed by the employer.
25. 233 S.C. 324, 104 S.E.2d 344 (1958).
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in Delmar Studios to pare down the territory clause of the covenant to include only that area which the business encompassed.
In addressing the question of whether the covenant could be enforced within such an area that would be reasonably necessary for
the protection of the covenantee, the court acknowledged the
existence of considerable disagreement on the subject of partial
enforcement.2" Recognizing the blue pencil rule as the majority
view, 2 the court then cited several authorities to support the
position that a covenant not readily severable by its terms is
entirely unenforceable. 2 Additionally, the court discussed the
minority view that enforces so much of the covenant as will impose a reasonable restraint29 without regard to whether the form of
the covenant is divisible.

Without expressly committing itself to either view, the court
refused to carve out a reasonable territory that would be enforceable. The court stressed that if the parties had desired a narrower
provision they should have agreed initially upon it.3" The court
relied on Pollock's treatise on contract law:
A restrictive covenant which contains or may be read as
containing distinct undertakings bounded by different limits of
space or time, or different in subject matter, may be good as to
part and bad as to part. But this does not mean that a single
covenant may be artificially split up in order to pick out some
part of it that it can be upheld. Severance is permissible only
in the case of a covenant which is in effect a combination of
several distinct covenants. 1
Admitting that persuasive arguments exist to support both views,
the court, however, refused to enforce the covenant to a reasonable territorial boundary, thereby rejecting the modem trend of
the case law:
The severability of the contract must be determined from
its language and subject matter, and the court cannot create a
new agreement for the parties in order to uphold the contract,
26. Id. at 331, 104 S.E.2d at 347.
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1659-1660 (Rev. ed. 1937)); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 518 (1932).

29. 233 S.C. at 331-32, 104 S.E.2d at 347-48.
30. Id. at 331-32, 104 S.E.2d at 348.
31. Id. at 332, 104 S.E.2d at 347-48 (quoting F. POLLOCK, CONTRACTS 335 (11th ed.
1942)).
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where the severable character32of the agreement is not determinable from the contract itself.
The court concluded that it would only consider the validity of
the original contract. If this initial covenant fails, the court would
not make a new agreement for the parties. Furthermore, the appellant's present willingness to accept a reasonable restriction did
clearly to
not influence the court; 33 the covenant was considered
34
state.
entire
the
covered
it
since
indivisible
be
The opportunity for partial enforcement of a covenant arose
again in Oxman v. Sherman3 where the court held that a covenant restricting an insurance agent from competing in "any territory in the State of South Carolina" 6 was unenforceable. 37 The
agent's assigned territory, however, had been composed exclusively of Orangeburg and Calhoun counties." The court did not
discuss the possibility of rewriting the covenant to cover only
these two counties. This decision evidenced a rejection of any
propensity to follow the modern trend which narrows the scope
of an indivisible covenant and enforces it to a reasonable extent.
In Eastern Business Forms, Inc. v. Kistler,31 the court reviewed its position regarding the blue pencil rule. The employer
sought to restrain and enjoin a former employee from violating
the following covenant contained in an employment contract:
It is further understood and agreed that upon the termination
of this contract Salesman is not to sell printing products of the
type produced or sold by Employer for a period of twelve (12)
months within a 100-mile radius of the City of Greenville nor
within a 100-mile radius of the central city of the assigned territory of Salesman."
Because the former employee's assigned territory had consisted
of three counties and all of his work had been basically within
these counties, the covenant was found by the trial court to be
unreasonable.41
32. Id. (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 289(a) at p. 1224 (1963)).
33. Id. at 332-33, 104 S.E.2d at 348.
34. Id. at 332, 104 S.E.2d at 348.
35. 239 S.C. 218, 122 S.E.2d 559 (1961).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 222, 122 S.E.2d at
Id. at 225, 122 S.E.2d at
Id.
258 S.C. 429, 189 S.E.2d
Id. at 432, 189 S.E.2d at
Id.

560.
562.
22 (1972).
23.
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The supreme court framed its inquiry in terms of "whether
the trial judge could, after holding that the 100-mile radius provision of the contract was unreasonable, sever that part of the contract and enforce the restrictive covenant contained in the contract only in the counties of Spartanburg, Cherokee and Union."4' 2
After defining the blue pencil rule in its traditional terms, the
court then recognized that some jurisdictions apply the rule even
though the provisions of the covenant pertaining to time or space
are indivisible.4 3 The result of such an application is that the
covenant is enforceable for so much of the performance as would
be reasonable. Furthermore, the Kistler court noted that the purpose in applying the blue pencil rule to indivisible promises is to
insure that the "legality of the restraint should not turn on the
mere form of the wording but upon the reasonableness of giving
effect to the indivisible promise to the extent that would be lawful."44 In rejecting this argument, the supreme court again referred to Pollock's treatise on contracts, which had been the justification for the court's earlier refusal to blue pencil the covenant
in Somerset.45
The Kistler decision reflects the court's view that partial
enforcement is equivalent to a judicial rewriting of the covenant:
The severability of the contract must be determined from its
language and subject matter; and where the severable character
of the agreement is not determinable from the contract itself,
the court, in order to uphold the contract, cannot create a new
agreement for the parties, for example, so as to make the restraint a partial restraint within a lesser area than that specified
in the covenant or for a lesser period of time.46
As applied to the covenant in question, the court found that the
100-mile radius stipulation provided no basis for dividing this
territory into a reasonable portion." Because the court believed
the covenant displayed the intent of the parties to treat the area
restraint as indivisible, the supreme court refused to enforce the
covenant to a reasonable extent although the parties assented to
42. Id. at 433, 189 S.E.2d at 23.

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
46. Eastern Business Forms, Inc. v. Kistler, 258 S.C. at 434, 189 S.E.2d at 24 (quoting
17 C.J.S. Contracts § 289(a) at p. 1224 (1963)). But see note 12 and accompanying text
supra.
47. Id. at 434, 189 S.E.2d at 24.
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such action." This result is consistent with the earler Somerset
decision."9 The following statement from the Kistler opinion is
indicative of the South Carolina Supreme Court's present response to the application of the blue pencil rule to covenants not
to compete:
The contract shows upon its face that it was the intent of the
parties thereto that this covenant be treated as indivisible. It
follows, that there is no basis for drawing a sharply defined line
separating the excess territory. We cannot make a new agreement for the parties into which they did not voluntarily enter.
We must uphold the covenant as written or not at all, it must
stand or fall integrally. The invalidity of the covenant is not
aided by the respondent's willingness to accept a restriction that
is proper in scope."
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court appears to have
left open the possibility of blue penciling a divisible covenant, the
court emphasizes in the Kistler decision that the parties intended
the covenant to be indivisible. Therefore, although a covenant
may appear in form to present a "sharply defined line" 52 by which
the court can sever the provision, the intent of the parties to treat
the contract as indivisible may provide the basis for refusing
severance.
The remaining case to consider is Almers v. South Carolina
National Bank of Charleston.0This action involved a forfeiture
provision in a noncontributory pension plan which provided that
if an employer left his job and went to work for a competitor, he
would forfeit the amount paid into the, pension plan by the employer. Because the clause was unlimited in its time and geographical restrictions, it was held to be unreasonably broad and,
therefore, invalid. Almers did not address the issue of partial
enforcement of the provision. The supreme court's decision to
invalidate the clause can be attributed both to the nature of the
restriction, a forfeiture of rights under a pension plan, and to the
failure of the clause to protect any legitimate commercial interest
of the bank.
48. Id.
49. See notes 25-34 and accompanying text supra.
50. Eastern Business Forms, Inc. v. Kistler, 258 S.C. at 434, 189 S.E.2d at 24.
51. Id.
52. Id. This language appears to have been adopted from 5 S. W=uSTON, CONTRAcrs
§ 1660 (Rev. ed. 1937).
53. 265 S.C. 48, 217 S.E.2d 135 (1975). A discussion of this case appears in Contracts,
1975 Survey of S.C. Law, 28 S.C.L. Rxv. 271, 279-83 (1975).
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DRAFTING COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE

Because the South Carolina court continues to adhere to the
view that the entire covenant is void when its terms are indivisible and unreasonably broad, the practitioner is in a precarious
position when drafting these covenants. In representing the employer, the practitioner must attempt to draw the terms of the
covenant as closely as possible to the boundary of permissible
restraint without exceeding it. The result of improper draftsmanship is that the employer is left without any of the protection that
the covenant is designed to provide. The South Carolina decisions
appear to indicate that if the severable character is determinable
from the contract, the judicial blue pencil may be applied so as
to render the covenant partially enforceable. 4 Additionally, the
supreme court has indicated its willingness to examine the intent
the covenant in determining
of the parties as well as the form of
55
whether the covenant is divisible.

A.

TerritorialRestrictions

Since the territorial restrictions in covenants not to compete
have been vulnerable to attack, the petitioner must be exceedingly cautious in drafting these clauses. The South Carolina Supreme Court has centered its examination on the employee's assigned territory.55 Further, the court has refined its analysis and
focused on the specific area in which the employee has actually
worked. 5 Therefore, if it is necessary to exceed the area in which
the employee has worked in order to protect the employer, the
justification for the enlarged territory should be incorporated into
the covenant. Frequently, the covenants are drafted when the
employee initially enters into employment with the covenantee.
At that time, it cannot be precisely determined where the em54. E.g., Eastern Business Forms, Inc. v. Kistler, 258 S.C. 429, 189 S.E.2d 22 (1972).
In Packard & Field v. Byrd, 73 S.C. 1, 51 S.E. 678 (1905), the court stated the following
regarding severability:
"Where there are several promises so that those which are legal can be separated
from those which are illegal, the legal promises may be enforced. A lawful
promise made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an unlawful promise was made at the same time and for the same consideration." Clark
on Contracts, 474.
Id. at 7, 51 S.E. at 680.
55. E.g., Somerset v. Reyner, 233 S.C. 324, 104 S.E.2d 344 (1958).
56. E.g., Eastern Business Forms, Inc. v. Kistler, 258 S.C. 429, 189 S.E.2d 22 (1972).
57. Id. at 432, 189 S.E.2d at 23.
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ployee will be assigned in the future. Consequently, it is necessary
to review periodically the territorial restriction in order to determine its continued validity.
B.

Time and Activity Restrictions

The South Carolina Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue of whether the blue pencil rule is applicable to
excessive time and activity restrictions. The court would, however, have difficulty in applying the blue pencil rule to an excessive time restraint since it would most likely not be divisible in
form. Activity restraints have not received any attention by the
South Carolina Supreme Court; consequently, caution should be
exercised if a covenant restricts an employee from engaging in
more than one activity. Language justifying this additional restraint should be incorporated into the covenant. Furthermore, a
multiple activity restraint should be stated in a manner divisible
in form, thereby preserving the argument that the blue pencil
rule could be applied.
The supreme court has not yet considered a covenant not to
compete involving an employee engaged in a technical field or an
employee with extensive professional training. In such a situation, two principles come into conflict. First, the employer may
be required to demonstrate a greater degree of justification for
restraints. 8 This must be balanced against the fact that extensively educated persons are frequently placed in positions of special confidences and, therefore, may have access to trade secrets
and customer lists. 9 Consequently, it is'precisely these employees
against whom the employer may need the protection afforded by
a covenant not to compete. Furthermore, the courts have given
58. E.g., Home v. Radiological Health Servs., P.C., 83 Misc.2d 446, 371 N.Y.S.2d
948, aff'd, 51 App. Div. 2d 544, 379 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1975); Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 28 N.Y.2d
45, 320 N.Y.S.2d 1, 268 N.E.2d 751 (1971).
59. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625, 684 (1960).
In reference to restrictions on the practice of physicians, it has been noted:
It is a firmly established doctrine that a member of one of the learned professions, upon becoming assistant to another member thereof, may, upon a sufficient consideration, bind himself not to engage in the practice of his profession
upon the termination of his contract of employment, within a reasonable territorial extent, as such an agreement is not in restraint of trade or against public
policy.
Annot., 58 A.L.R. 156, 162 (1929). The need to protect technological and trade secrets has
been recognized in recent decisions as a factor pertaining to the reasonableness of the
restraint. Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 397, 407 (1975).
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additional weight to society's interests when covenants attempt
to restrict professionally trained employees from being productive
in their field.."
C.

Consideration

Another drafting requisite is that the covenant include adequate consideration for the covenant not to compete." It is advisable that the consideration for the covenant not to compete be
stated separately from that given for the actual performance during employment. This can be accomplished by providing for compensation after termination. In Aiston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V.
2 the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of adequate considGress"
eration. After termination of employment, the employee was to
receive fifty percent of his first year compensation paid under the
employment contract and his second year consideration was to be
determined by one-half of that paid during the first year after
termination. In striking down the covenant, the court scrutinized
the limitless geographic area and the broad range of activities
from which the employee was restricted. Even though the consideration was to some extent stated separately, the court found it
to be interwoven with the void portion of the contract and could
not be severed. Although this case was decided under Virginia
law, its implications appear to be consistent with the principles
enunciated in the South Carolina decision of Packard & Field v.
Byrd: 3 "Where the consideration or promise is single, there is no
difficulty in pronouncing the contract indivisible, and in declaring the whole void if there be illegality in the consideration or
...
1
promise.
D.

Express Provisionsfor PartialEnforcement and Divisibility

Some employment contracts contain express provisions to
the effect that if a restriction is determined to be unenforceable,
it is to be reduced to enforceable limits. In Credit Bureau Management Co. v. Huie,15 the contract stipulated that if the five year
60. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HAav.L. REv. 625, 684 (1960).
See also Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 1014 (1975).
61. See generally Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 825 (1973).
62. 492 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1974).
63. 73 S.C. 1, 51 S.E. 678 (1905).
64. Id. at 6, 51 S.E. at 679.
65. 254 F. Supp. 547 (D. Ark. 1966).
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restriction should result in the covenant's being unenforceable,
the duration of the restriction could be reduced to an enforceable
period. Additionally, if the restriction should be unenforceable
from the standpoint of area, then the scope of this restriction
would be reduced to reasonable limits. Although the case was
decided on other grounds, the court indicated that the policy
against rewriting contracts would not be as strong in light of these
provisions. Express provisions have also been included which
state that if an aspect of a covenant is found to be invalid, it can
be eliminated and the remaining provisions enforced. The effect
of this stipulation is to authorize the application of the blue pencil rule. Corbin has advocated that these provisions be given full
effect when the only reason for refusing to enforce the covenant
is the court's fear of" 'making a contract for the parties.' ,6
CONCLUSION

The South Carolina Supreme Court has remained firm in its
refusal to give partial enforcement to a covenant which is indivisible in form. Unlike the majority of jurisdictions, South Carolina
has continued to refrain from exercising the judicial blue pencil
even when a covenant is divisible. Since each provision of a covenant is vulnerable to attack, the practitioner must rely, therefore,
upon accurate and precise draftsmanship rather than the blue
pencil rule to render a covenant enforceable in South Carolina.
Kathleen E. Crum
66. 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1390 (1951 & Supp. 1964).
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